



SU+ @ Strathmore 
University Library  
  
 





Rogue access point detection framework on a 




Fredrick K. Barasa 









Barasa, K. F. (2019). Rogue access point detection framework on a multivendor access point 




This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by DSpace @Strathmore  University. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DSpace @Strathmore University. For more 
information, please contact librarian@strathmore.edu 









Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in 
Information Technology at Strathmore University 
 
 









This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and 







I declare that this work has not been previously submitted and approved for the award of a 
degree by this or any other University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis 
contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due 
reference is made in the thesis itself. 
© No part of this thesis may be reproduced without the permission of the author and Strathmore 
University 
Fredrick Kunjira Barasa 
……………………….. 




The thesis of Fredrick Kunjira Barasa was reviewed and approved by the following:   
Dr. Vitalis Gavole Ozianyi 
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Information Technology, 
Strathmore University 
 
Dr. Joseph Orero 
Dean, Faculty of Information Technology 
Strathmore University 
 
Prof. Ruth Kiraka 








Wireless internet access has become common throughout the world. IEEE 802.11 Wireless 
fidelity (Wi-Fi) is now a common internet access standard almost becoming a requirement in 
homes, offices, universities and public places due to developments in Bring-Your-Own-Device 
(BYOD), mobile telephony and telecommuting. With the proliferation of Wi-Fi comes a 
number of information security challenges that have to be addressed.  One of the major security 
threats that comes with Wi-Fi is the presence of rogue access points (APs) on the network. 
Unsuspecting employees in a company or attackers can introduce rogue APs to a secure wired 
network. The problem is amplified if the wireless local area network (WLAN) consist of multi-
vendor APs. Malicious people can leverage on rogue APs to perform passive or active attacks 
on a computer network. Therefore, there is need for network administrators to accurately, with 
less effort, detect and control presence of rogue APs on multivendor WLANs. 
In this thesis, a solution that can accurately support detection of rogues APs on a multi-vendor 
AP WLAN without extra hardware or modification of AP firmware is presented. In the 
solution, information from beacon frames is compared to a set of approved parameters. 
Intervention of a network administrator is included to prevent MAC address spoofing. A 
structured methodology was adopted in developing the model on a Windows operating system. 
Python programming language was used in coding the system with Scapy and Tkinter as the 
main modules. SQLite database was used to store required data. The system was tested on a 
setup WLAN that composed of three different access points in a University lab. It was able to 
capture beacon frames sent by the access points and extracted MAC address, SSID and 
capability information as the key parameters used in identifying and classifying the access 
points. The system uses the captured information to automatically compare it against an 
existing database of authorized parameters. It is then able to classify an access point as either 
rogue or authorized. The system issued alerts that described the detected APs to a network 
administrator. The rest of this document gives details of scholarly works that are pertinent to 
the study, the research methodology used, implementation and testing of the model followed 
by discussions of findings and the conclusions and recommendations made by the researcher. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the background of the study, the problem under study, the main aim and 
specific objectives of the study. Research questions are also stated; justification, scope and 
limitations of the study are given. 
1.2 Background to the Study 
Wireless internet access has become common globally. Many organizations use Wireless local 
area networks (WLANs) to provide access to internet and intranet for employees and clients. 
This facilitates flexibility and mobility. With proliferation of BYOD concept, wireless access 
has also grown. Wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) is used to describe a group of IEEE 801.11 
technological specifications that enable devices to establish and connect to a wireless local area 
network transmitted using 2.4 or 5 GHz spectrum (Tektronix, 2015). Wi-Fi came to 
prominence at the turn of the millennium when 801.11 standards were refined and personal 
computer manufacturers began to market Wi-Fi equipped computers. With the distribution of 
affordable wireless routers, Wi-Fi has quickly become ubiquitous in private homes. WLANs 
have also taken hold in offices and universities where local area Ethernet networks already 
exist, while some businesses such as restaurants and cafés install Wi-Fi hotspots to attract more 
customers (Economist, 2004). Wi-Fi hotspots can now be expected where there are intersecting 
flows of commerce and people (Lambert, McQuire, & Papastergiadis, 2013). 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 has six targets that seek to develop global partnership 
for development. These includes availing benefits of new technologies, especially ICT in 
collaboration with the private sector. Internet penetration is one of the enablers of this target 
yet it is still a big concern in developing countries (Philbeck, 2017). Internet penetration as at 
December 2017 is 35.2% in Africa, rest of the world is 58.4% and the world average is 54.4% 
(Internet World Stats, 2017). The cheapest way as at now to supply internet to rural remote 
areas of Kenya and Africa as such is through wireless networks. WLANs and Wireless Wide 





The increase of WLANs usage comes with growth in their challenges. One of the major 
concerns with wireless internet access is the inherent security risk. WLANs are known easy 
victims of both passive and active attacks facilitated through different man-in-the-middle attack 
techniques. This is mainly because information transmitted through wireless networks is 
broadcasted to everyone within the vicinity of the network. This research considers the most 
used method of attacking WLANs and in extension secure Ethernet LANs; rogue APs. Many 
network administrators agree that presence of rogue APs on their WLANs pose the biggest 
security threat to the network including the core Ethernet networks (Vanjale & Mane, 2014). 
A rogue access point (rogue AP) is any active wireless access point that is has not been 
authorized by the WLAN personnel. Such an access point can be installed by either plugging 
an access point directly into an Ethernet port or by using two wireless interfaces (Han H. , 
Sheng, Tan, Li, & Lu, 2009). In the latter, the first wireless interface is connected to an 
authorized access point, and the other acts as an access point to allow unsuspecting client 
devices to connect to it. Rogue APs connected to Ethernet are rare and easier to detect and 
control compared to those connected to legitimate APs. 
1.2.1 WLAN Rogue Access Point Attack Characteristics 
Rogue APs can be utilized by malicious individuals to perform two primary kinds of attacks 
on a network; passive and active attacks. 
Passive attack is an information gathering attack where the attacker only listens to the traffic 
traversing the network but does not perform any other action like sniffing or modifying packets. 
It is the first step before propelling an actual attack itself. Amid passive attacks, the victim has 
no real way to recognize the attacker’s action because the attacker is not acting (Amiel, 
Villegas, Feix, & Marcel, 2007). The attacker can therefore remain undetected for a long time 
on the network. One of the passive attacks is cracking Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
encryption. In breaking a WEP encryption the attacker needs to sniff an enormous number of 
packets. The attacker then captures several wireless frames and then attempts to crack WEP 
offline. The attacker does not need to communicate with the victim at all. Second technique of 
passive attacks is simply sitting between two communicating parties and sniffing their 
conversations using a special too such as Wireshark. This requires the attacker to know the 
encryption key of the wireless connection. The attacker has a clear view of the messages if the 
communicating parties are using clear text protocols such as HTTP which do not use encryption 





attacker has to capture the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 4-way handshake that is 
happening between a wireless client and access point. The attacker then uses an offline 
dictionary or brute-force attack on the sniffed packets. The attacker may not need to 
communicate with the victim at all but in some cases where the victim is already authenticated 
to the access point, the attacker may have to inject wireless deauthentication frames to force 
the victim to reauthenticate hence performing a new 4-way handshake that the attacker 
captures. The constant flapping of the wireless connection from authentication to de-
authentication jeopardizes the Wi-Fi experience to users.  
Active attacks are common because the attacker communicates with the victims hence able to 
be detected on the network. The attacker actively participates in a communication by capturing 
and modifying packets between any communicating parties. This affects WLAN operation. An 
attacker leveraging a rogue AP can cause a denial of service (DoS) attack by sending 
deauthentication frame to clients thus forcing them to disconnect from genuine access points. 
This leads to periodic authentication and to de-authenticate and making the overall wireless 
experience very bad. The attacker can also use a jamming device to interfere with wireless 
signals thus degrading the Wi-Fi. Man-in-Middle (MiM) attack happens when an attacker uses 
two network interface cards whereby one card connects to a legitimate access point as a client 
while the second card advertises a fake SSID to lure unsuspecting clients to connect. The 
attacker creates a rogue access point. Evil twin attack demonstrates this type of active attack 
clearly. The access point may be having the same SSID and BSSID as the authorized ones. The 
evil twin is set to pass traffic through to the authorized AP while sniffing the client’s 
communication or it can cause a DoS upon capturing confidential information such as 
usernames, passwords and banking details. 
Multivendor AP WLANs are becoming common as many network administrators want the 
flexibility of implementing APs of their choice to cut costs, provide wider coverage while 
improving performance and circumventing the restrictions imposed by specific vendors. This 
makes rogue AP detection even more complex as vendor specific WLAN controllers will easily 
report other vendor APs as rogue. For instance, if a WLAN runs on RUCKUS, CISCO, Juniper 
and Aruba APs will be reported as rogues on a Ruckus controller unless explicitly specified by 
the network administrator as knowns or neighbors. 
This research proposed a model that can easily and accurately distinguish rogue APs from 





frames to get properties of APs and comparing the properties against defined parameters. The 
system borrows a little from some properties of network packet sniffers. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Rogue APs create dangerous loopholes for attacks on both WLANs and secure local area 
networks. They facilitate various man-in-the-middle attacks that can greatly damage network 
usage through denial of service attacks and theft of data (Gopinath & Hemant, 2009). The area 
of rogue APs in Wi-Fi security has been actively researched in the recent past signifying the 
importance of the matter. Multiple solutions have been proposed and developed to detect and 
eliminate rogue APs on wireless networks. Most of these frameworks and solutions support a 
single vendor access point WLANs. Some require costly extra hardware resources or 
modification of existing firmware which is costly to implement in many organizations. 
Network administrators find some solutions too technically complex to configure and deploy 
especially those based on Linux systems. They require use of advanced configuration 
commands and techniques that are sometimes hard for an ordinary network operator to 
comprehend. This study sought to develop a solution that can easily and accurately perform 
detection of rogues APs on a multi-vendor AP WLAN without forcing network operators to 
use extra hardware such as USB cards or modify their access point firmware to function. The 
result is a system that reads and interprets beacon frames from connected APs to categorize 
them as either genuine, rogue or neighbor based on preset conditions. 
1.4 Aim  
The main goal of this research was to develop a suitable rogue AP detection system for multi-
vendor WLAN environments that can be adopted by network operators to notice rogue APs on 
the network. 
1.5 Specific Objectives 
In order to achieve the above stated goal, the researcher worked to achieve the following 
objectives: 
i. To evaluate current rogue AP detection techniques. 
ii. To establish important parameters necessary for classifying access points on a WLAN. 
iii. To create a classification criterion for access points on a multivendor WLAN based on 





iv. To develop a model for detecting rogue APs on a multivendor WLAN. 
1.6 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the above stated objectives, this research answered the following questions: 
i. What are the existing and proposed models for detecting rogue APs on a WLAN? 
ii. What are the important parameters necessary to identify access points on a WLAN? 
iii. How do we classify access points on a multivendor WLAN based on the distinguishing 
parameters? 
iv. How will a cross-platform system for detecting rogue APs on a multivendor WLAN 
function? 
1.7 Justification 
Presence of rogue APs on a WLAN is a big security threat that keeps network administrators 
actively looking for proper detection solutions (Vanjale & Mane, 2014). Rogue APs are 
commonly used to facilitate active and passive attacks on networks. The problem is amplified 
if the network consists of APs from different vendors. Adoption of BYOD practice will also 
increase the risk of attacks occurring on an organization’s network due to fake or rogue access 
points. Current rogue AP detection systems such as Wireless Intrusion Prevention Systems 
(WIPS) and vendor-specific WLAN controllers cost more money to purchase and maintain.  
They also work best with the specific vendor access points. These solutions do not function 
properly in multivendor WLAN environments. They can wrongly label APs from other vendors 
as rogues. There is need for an effective and less costly rogue AP detection system that can 
accurately identify rogue APs on a multivendor WLAN. Network administrators desire to 
deploy access points from more than one vendor on their network to reduce costs and utilize 
an access point capacity fully. This is through buying affordable access points and deploying 
an access point that is best suited to serve a given group of clients in a specific area of the 
network. Primary benefactors of this system are network administrators or operators because 
they need to accurately detect presence of rogue APs on their network before devising a good 
elimination technique on a multivendor access point WLAN. The system developed from this 
research is easy to deploy and configure to function on both single and multivendor WLAN 
AP environments. The system uses clear installation instructions that even non-technical 





take unlike command-line interfaces that require mastery of commands. Network 
administrators or operators will find the system a very resourceful addition to their WLAN 
management systems. 
1.8 Scope and Limitation 
This research is limited to detection of rogue wireless access points on a multivendor WLAN. 
Elimination of rogue APs is beyond the scope of this research. The result of the research is a 
cross-platform system that reads and interprets beacon frames from connected APs and 
compares the obtained parameters against set rules to categorize them as either authorized, 





CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Many researchers have already proposed various models for detecting rogue wireless access 
points on WLANs. Some software such as vendor specific WLAN controllers and wireless 
intrusion prevention systems (WIPS) like solarWinds and Airtights are already doing the job 
albeit with many demerits. This chapter explores some of the proposed and existing solutions 
for detecting and eliminating rogues APs. A critical view of these solutions is discussed to 
make the existing gap and the problem under study clearer. Research constraints for the topic 
under this research are latter discussed in the chapter followed by an elaborate conceptual 
framework for the proposed rogue detection framework. 
2.2 Existing and Proposed Wireless Rogue AP Detection Solutions 
Pesce (2006) implemented a low cost rogue access point detection system using Kismet and 
disposable hardware. He used Kismet_drone on Linksys WRT54GL wireless router. This 
required flashing of the router’s firmware and using extra hardware that the user had to 
purchase. Configuring Kismet on Linksys WRT54GL is a complex process that is also time 
consuming especially if the access points are many. There were some difficulties obtaining 
signal information from Kismet_drone on a WRT54GL due to the nature of the wireless 
drivers. This type of a solution has many technical difficulties and ineffective for large scale 
deployment (Pesce, 2006). 
Han H. et al (2009) proposed a measurement based rogue AP detection technique that uses 
timing information based on round trip time (RTT) to allow the client device to independently 
determine whether an AP is a legitimate or not without assistance from the WLAN 
administrator. The algorithm relies only on existing networking protocols to work, and can be 
applied to any regular WLAN. They considered a malicious attacker that actively controls the 
rogue AP to avoid detection as opposed to an accidental rogue AP deployed non malicious 
people (Han H. , Sheng, Tan, Li, & Lu, 2009). The algorithm can introduce significant delays 
on a WLAN as clients probe the access points and wait for query such as DNS responses before 





Bo Yan et al.(2009) proposed a method that involves an administrator on Ethernet LAN checks 
using wireless traffic sniffing tools to detect rogue APs. The algorithm works well and easily 
allows other rogue AP models on a Wi-Fi channel that is even congested. However, attackers 
who knows the algorithm can block the traffic that verifies them easily on their AP to launch 
attacks to other APs on a WLAN. 
Wei et al (2007) modelled a rogue AP detection algorithm that makes use of sequential 
hypothesis test to detect rogue APs on a WLAN. In their approach, inbound traffic is monitored 
on a router and a decision is made on the passively collected TCP-ACK pairs. However, using 
ACK pairs restricts this approach to TCP traffic only. 
Roth et al (2008) came up with a technique that aids a client device to sense the presence of an 
evil-twin AP in a WLAN. In their approach, cryptographic key exchange is achieved by short 
authentication string protocols. The short strings are verified by encoding the short strings as a 
sequence of color, carried out sequentially by user device and from particular access point. 
Wireless APs are required to have a light with ability to show double colors. The devices should 
have a minimum of one button in addition to displaying the double colors. Every string of 
authentication is changed into a sequence of color made up of two unique colors. The wireless 
AP and the client device both render the sequences one color at a time. The AP’s light must be 
mounted where users can see it and trust that it is a genuine AP. The person using the device 
presses a defined button on their device causing both lights to display subsequent color in the 
series. The colors continue displaying for the length of time the button is pressed down and 
therefore users can see the colors as long as they need to see comparison between them 
effectively. The user can choose how much of the sequence to compare depending on the 
desired security level. Once the user has completed comparing, they indicate whether they 
accept or deny the connection by the designated button or other modes of input. This approach 
is limiting and requires user devices to have specific button. Most user-engaging solutions are 
not effective because once a user has a successful connection, they do not bother checking on 
the whether the connecting AP is genuine or rogue. 
Another approach looked at a composite system that detects and counter-control the rogue APs 
on a WLAN. The approach proposed a centralized system that gathers wireless data simply 
with the help of its own access points. The wireless data is analyzed to detect rogue AP. After 
the data analysis, if rogue AP is found, then the central system uses a switch to disable the port 





on existing WLAN. If the central system takes the wireless data from rogue access point for 
analysis then whole system will not work correctly (Srisalak, K, & A, 2009).  
Nikbakhsh et al (2012) proposed a client side approach for the detection of Man-in-the-Middle 
attack and Evil-Twin attack performed by rogue access point. This method compares the 
gateways and routes through which packets travels and warns users to avoid connecting to the 
rogue APs. The method can easily be implemented without modifying a network and without 
involving network admin. It is also easy to implement on mobile devices but an attacker can 
easily break its security using a sniffing programs.  
Vanjale and Mane (2014) developed a rogue access point elimination model that uses two 
approaches, learning mode and detection mode, as shown in their system architecture in figure 
2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1: Learning and Detection Mode System Architecture 
Source: Vanjale and Mane (2014, p3) 
The learning mode creates a list of authorized APs with their parameters such as MAC address, 
SSID and Received Signal Strength (RSSI) of the access point. Their mode of detecting rogue 
APs inputs the list of authorized access points parameters and checks against the detected 





address and finally RSSI. If the detected AP has matching parameters or RSSI in the range of 
+10 to -10 it is categorized as authorized automatically. The system can work easily on small 
networks but it can be very slow on large networks due to processing time need. This approach 
is also prone to MAC address spoofing and it is possible to give false positives to system 
administrators. 
Jana & Kasera (2008) provides server side approach using clock skews of access point in a 
wireless network. This approach has a number of challenges. First, it cannot detect MAC 
address spoofing. It also lacks accuracy. It is slow when calculating clock skews in TCP/ICMP. 
The approach does not favor lightweight solution. However, the approach has some 
advantages, which includes ability to measure effect of temperature variations, virtualizations 
and Network Time Protocol (NTP) synchronization on clock skews. Clock skews can act like 
fingerprints and thus they can be unique to each AP. 
To help in reducing the cost of deploying sensors, Bahl, et al. (2006) developed an approach 
that uses dense array of dedicated sensor nodes which uses cheap radio devices like USB 
wireless adapters. Their proposed framework called Dense Array of Inexpensive Radios 
(DAIR) was found useful in detecting rogue APs attached to corporate networks and also 
detecting Denial of Service attacks on Wi-Fi networks. Their proposed solution was based on 
two assumptions that there are many desktop machines with good wired connection, and extra 
CPU and disk resources in every enterprise environment. Secondly, cheap USB-based wireless 
adapters can be easily obtained in the market. They attached these cheap adapters to desktop 
computers, and dedicated the adapters to fully monitor the Wi-Fi network. This way they 
achieved a low cost wireless management infrastructure. This solution will however fail in an 
environment where different vendor APs operate. The desktop computers must be in the range 
of the rogue APs signal for detection and this can be highly limiting and causing inflexibility 
on the WLAN topology. Their two assumptions are also not necessarily true.  Figure 2.2 below 
displays the arrangement of components on their proposed sensor infrastructure. This set up 
will fail on a multivendor environment. 
Chirumamilla & Ramamurthy (2003) and Sriram, Sahoo, & Agrawal (2010) proposed a system 
to detect and response to intrusion that works using agent model for rogue APs. Based on their 
system, every agent device has network cards that have capability to sniff communication 
traffic on a given network and return detailed information on packets of any newly added APs 






Figure 2.2: System Architecture of DAIR 
Source : Bahl, et al. (2006, p3) 
The server compares the information collected from the APs to a database of known APs 
manually created to detect rogue APs. This approach requires installation of Mobile Agent 
System and Client Application on APs, a task that can be complex and difficult to achieve in a 
multi-vendor AP environment. Their system structure is as depicted in figure 2.3 below. 
 
Figure 2.3: System Architecture of an Agent Model 
Source: Chirumamilla & Ramamurthy (2003, p 493) 
The approach is also vulnerable to MAC address spoofing making it less suitable for actual 
use. 
Kohno, Broido, & Claffy (2005) have demonstrated that the skew of the clock of a given device 





Kasera (2008) went further to explore the use of clock skew of a WLAN AP as a fingerprint to 
uniquely identify rogue APs. They calculated every AP’s clock skews by collecting their 
beacons and probe messages. If an AP’s clock skew differs from the clock skews saved in a 
database, the AP is classified as rogue. This approach is effective for identifying rogue APs 
connected to a WLAN by malicious outsiders, but cannot effectively identify rogue APs 
connected to a network by malicious insiders due to periodic clock synchronization among 
nodes on the network. 
Corbett, Beyah, & Copeland (2006) proposed the use of a spectral analysis to sense wireless 
traffic and identify the type of Network Interface Cards (NIC) on a network. NICs that are 
different from that of authorized node are noticed because 802.11 physical layer consists of 
many data transfer rates whereby each rate relates to a different physical layer (PHY) frequency 
modulation scheme. The rate switching algorithm specified by the vendor in each (node) AP 
selects the proper rate (frequency modulation scheme) for transmitting packets. The rate may 
change during frame transmission and hence significant and unique jumps in the Inter-packet 
Arrival Time (IAT) occurs. Any person can perform artificial production of the variations and 
the unique signatures to the wireless traffic on the network will be created by malicious 
attackers. Any unidentified signatures on the network correspond to rogue nodes (APs). This 
approach is not effective on a multivendor AP WLAN. 
Kaoa, Liaob, & Lib (2009) proposed a client-side bottleneck bandwidth as a distinguishing 
feature between wired and wireless hosts. Their approach establishes whether packets from a 
given IP address are originating from APs based on client-side bottleneck bandwidth. This 
reduces network monitoring to a stationary office job by examining the packets traversing the 
core switch. Accuracy of the method is claimed to be over 99% when the parameter, sliding 
window size, of the proposed algorithm is larger than 20. Though the method effectively 
reduces monitoring workload while improving network security, it is subject MAC spoofing 
and ineffective on a multivendor WLAN. 
Song, Yang, & Gu (2010) leveraged on the packet transmission structure and extra hops present 
in an evil twin attack set up. Where an evil twin AP exists, the client reaches a remote server 
through an evil twin AP and an authorized AP. This introduces one more wireless hop in the 
communication. Using the Inter-packet Arrival Time (IAT), it is possible to detect presence of 
rogue AP. This can achieve detection of rogue APs on the network but will fail on a meshed 





Monica & Ribeiro (2011) developed WiFiHop, a client-sided tool that uses the intrinsic multi-
hop traits of the evil twin attack, to detect the attack. Their tool claims technology independence 
and detects the attacks before any user traffic is transmitted. In their approach, the user sends 
a watermarked packet to the echo server, and then listens on different channels. If an evil twin 
attack exists, the watermark will of course be seen on the link between the evil twin AP and 
the legitimate AP. This method will also fail where a meshed network exists by wrongly 
classifying an AP on mesh as rogue. 
Chumchu, Saelim, & Sriklauy (2011) proposed the use of Physical Layer Convergence 
Protocol (PLCP) header of IEEE 802.11 frames to detect a rogue AP from an authorized AP. 
The frequency variation types and data rates in PLCP header are dependent on rate algorithm 
used in the drivers of the wireless adaptors or a vendor’s AP and the environment. Hence, it is 
very difficult to imitate the modulation. But it is possible that the data rate of a rogue AP can 
be similar to the data rate of an authorized AP because of the limited data rates and modulation 
types found in 802.11 specifications thus making the approach vulnerable to rogue AP attacks. 
Kagan (2003) suggested a TCP Fingerprinting method where the differences in the way a target 
AP responds to some well-defined packets are recorded with the intention of establishing the 
operating system target AP system. Unique packet fields from various operating systems are 
captured. This approach is advantageous because it uses simple tools like NMap to perform a 
scan of the entire network and collect the analyzed information form rogue APs. It however 
takes a long time to scan a large network. Also, TCP fingerprinting cannot achieve 100% 
accuracy. Nmap makes guesses of the operating systems using the data it obtains but it may 
give false positives or false negatives sometimes. 
Kangsuk, et al. (2012) proposed a user-side framework based on the security condition of AP’s 
which includes the encryption and authentication type already specified by the APs vendors. 
They agued that it is hard to imitate the authentication type that is specified as IEEE 802.1X 
by the AP vendors. This framework sniffs beacon frames to collect necessary information. 
Genuine APs’ SSID and security level stored in a database by the network operator are 
compared to collected AP information. An AP whose information varies from the stored 
information is categorized as rogue. Inaddition, if suspected rogue AP’s security level is lower, 
the user can optionally decide to use a more secure channel suggested by the framework. This 






2.2.5 Research Constraints 
This research focused on developing a framework for detecting rogue access points on a 
multivendor WLAN. It was however limited to detection only. Elimination of the detected 
rogue APs under the proposed framework will be explored in future due to limited time 
available for this research. The research was done within a tight schedule, being part of the 
author’s postgraduate course requirement, and as such some very fine concepts of WLAN may 
not be covered. 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
Detection of rogue access points is dependent on the presence of rogue APs on a WLAN. The 
system captures beacon frames and extract parameters such as SSID, ESSID and capability 
information that include encryption standards from the beacon frames broadcasted by the 
connected different vendor APs. The sniffed parameters represent an active AP on the network. 
The system compares the sniffed parameters to pre-stored authorized parameters, if they differ, 
the AP is marked as rogue. If the sniffed parameters are the same as those of an existing 
authorized AP, the detected AP is put on a waiting list until the network administrator approves 
the AP as authorized. This ensures that even if a rogue AP spoofs a MAC address of an 
authorized AP (MAC address spoofing is common in Wi-Fi attacks), the network administrator 
will still notice the rogue AP. This also prevents the system from wrongly categorizing a rogue 
AP as authorized (issuing false alerts). Output from the system is communicated to the network 
administrator inform of alerts in a summary table by the system. The concept of the system can 





                                                                                                                                                   
Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework 
 





CHAPTER THREE  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses in details the way the researcher will carry out the study and construct 
the proposed solution. It outlines the tools and techniques that will be used by the researcher to 
collect and analyze necessary data. Contents of the chapter are therefore organized into 
following subheadings; research design, location of the study, target population, data collection 
and analysis. 
3.2 Research Design 
This research design was mainly experimental whereby the researcher performed experiments 
with different access points in a computer laboratory in the research location. The researcher 
performed experiments on different vendor access points to establish common and 
distinguishing characteristics of the APs. Experimental method was adopted because the result 
from the experiments were expected to be specific and should be able to applied to other similar 
projects once analyzed. It can also be used together with other research methods (University of 
Southern California, 2010).  Complete observations were made and access point parameters 
contained in beacon frames were recorded by the researcher. The researcher further reviewed 
vendor specific access point manuals and documentation on APs to obtain more information 
necessary in describing the access points. Quantitative approach was important in analyzing 
and understanding properties of different vendor APs and the common parameters between 
them. Results from the system testing included some numerical data which were well analyzed 
before drawing conclusions. 
3.3 Location of the Study 
The study was conducted in Strathmore University in Nairobi city in Kenya because it was 
easier for the researcher to obtain permission to setup an experimental WLAN in one of the 
university research labs. The researcher, being a student of the university, had access to the lab 
freely. There was no need of any special access to the network because the researcher only 
needed a working space with access points to experiment with and ordinary user access rights 






3.4 Data Collection 
3.4.1 The experiment 
The experiment consisted of active D-Link, Tp-Link and a Samsung phone with hotspot on as 
the access points, software tools and a laptop. The D-Link access point was configured to 
broadcast an SSID named “CHIAGA”, Tp_Link broadcasted “Berry2015” while the Samsung 
hotspot broadcasted “Hard”. The software component included Microsoft Network Monitor 
3.4 for changing the laptop’s network interface card into monitor mode under Windows 7 
operating system and also sniffing beacon frames, Wireshark was used to analyze the captured 
frames to help the researcher make observations of important parameters common in beacon 
frames. The Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4 should first be configured to enable it to sniff on 
appropriate interface as needed by the user. The network interface card must be changed into 
monitor mode to enable it listen to management frames such as beacons on the network. The 
access points were powered up. Figure 3.1 below shows actual sniffing of Wi-Fi management 
frames of type beacon frames using Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4 tool. 
 
Figure 3.1: Capturing 802.11 Beacon Frames using Network Monitor 3.4 
3.4.2 Observation 
The researcher tested and made observations from the three live access points from different 
vendors on the most common and distinguishing properties of the APs on a WLAN. Captured 
information was stored in a pcap file for analysis. Wireshark was used to analyze the 






Figure 3.2: Wireshark Analysis of Beacon Frames 
The researcher performed a deeper analysis of beacon frames from each of the access points. 
Figure 3.3 below shows a snapshot of what was revealed when the D-Link packet highlighted 
in figure 3.2 above was opened for deeper analysis. It was noted that a beacon frame is of layer 
IEEE Dot11 standard. It is of type 0 and subtype 8. It carries detailed information about the 
sending access point. 
 
Figure 3.3: Wireshark Analysis of a single Beacon Frame 
The common and unique parameters of interest to this research as observed from the Wireshark 






Parameter Value Set Description 
Type/Subtype 0x0008 (common) Serves to distinguish 802.11 beacon 




ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (common) This is a broadcast MAC address 
indicating that the access points send 
beacon frames as a broadcast so that 







This is the MAC address of the access 
point that is originating the beacon 
frame 
Capability information 0x0431 WEP 
(unique) 
It shows the type of encryption 
supported by the sending access point 
SSID CHIAGA (unique) Service Set Identifier is a configured 
name of the Wi-Fi signal broadcasted 
by an access point 
Table 3.1: Observed AP Parameters 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Descriptive analysis was used to summarize the captured data and to describe the parameters 
required in the research. This was necessary for a better understanding of what went on or what 
happened during the experiments and the observations. Beacon frames captured by the 
Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4 tool were analyzed with the help of Wireshark tool as discussed 
in the data collection and observation subsections of this chapter. 802.11 beacon frame is a 
layered frame. It consists of the following segments; 24-bit MAC header, 16-bit mandatory 
part with varying frame body and SSID and a 48-bit optional with varying part robust security 
network, extended rates, country information and Time Indication Map for each access point. 
The beacon frame structure is common across all access points. Destination MAC address was 
similar for all access points. Source MAC address, SSID and encryption were varying with 
each access point. SSID and encryption parameters were set by the researcher.  The Wireshark 






Figure 3.4: Beacon Frame Structure in Wireshark   
The structure can be well understood using figure 3.5 below that was created by Gast (2005). 
 
Figure 3.5: Beacon Frame in Detail 
Source : Gast (2005) 
The researcher established that frame type and subtype, source address, SSID and encryption 
found in the Capability Information were important parameters in developing the rogue AP 
detection model on a multivendor WLAN environment. In the model, authorized access points 
at least similar SSID and encryption. The model is able to detect these parameters automatically 
by sniffing beacon frames and using an algorithm to find the specific parameters. This is 





sniffed parameters are compared to a database of authorized access points. If a match is found, 
the detected access point is put on a waiting list for further approval by the network 
administrator. This ensures that no rogue access point can spoof the MAC address of an 
authorized access point unnoticed. In the case of a mismatch, the algorithm classifies the 
detected access point as rogue and it is added to a list of rogue APs that are displayed to the 
network administrator. The researcher was able to develop the framework for detecting rogue 
APs on a multivendor WLAN developed using the parameters established in this chapter. The 
model was designed and developed and eventually tested as an operational rogue AP detection 
system prototype. 
3.6 System Design and Development 
The system development methodology used was Waterfall. Waterfall methodology is 
advantageous because it allowed for departmentalization and control of the rogue AP detection 
system development process. It was easier to set a schedule with deadlines for each stage of 
development and the system proceeded through the development stages one after the other. 
Development begun with the concept, which moved to system design, implementation and 
testing phase. The maintenance phase was left out of the methodology at this point of the study 
because the model is still a prototype that requires further development. Each phase of 
development followed in the strict order as depicted in figure 3.1 below adopted from Saracco 
(2018).  
 
Figure 3.6: Modified Waterfall Methodology 





3.6.1 System Analysis 
Object oriented analysis approach was used in the study because as Kung and Lei (2016) noted; 
it has the ability to represent complex relationships, data and processing of the data in a stable 
notation that makes it easier to convert analysis outcome into designs. Using this approach 
enabled the researcher to create a model of the rogue AP system’s functional requirements that 
were independent of actual implementation constraints. 
3.6.2 System Design 
Conceptualization and design of the system used draw.io which is a free online tool for making 
flowcharts, UML diagrams, charts, ER and network diagrams. Use cases and interaction 
diagrams were drawn using this tool. Database design was accomplished using MySQL 
Workbench tool which the researcher found readily available and easier to use within the 
limited time frame of the research. 
3.6.3 System Implementation and Development 
The system was developed using Python as the main language. This was mainly because 
Python is both a powerful high level and low-level programming language that has APIs and 
frameworks that can easily capture frames and packets on a WLAN for analysis. Python was 
also found easier to use.  
3.6.4 System Testing 
The rogue detection system first underwent a hardware/software testing to ensure that 
interactions between the hardware and software components were working as intended. A 
usability testing was also carried out during system testing to evaluate the system’s adherence 
to its requirements. Test results were analyzed to draw conclusions as detailed in chapter five 
of this document. 
3.7 Research Quality 
The researcher considers quality to be key in conducting this research. The research will 
carefully follow the research methodology described in this chapter. Correct tools and 
techniques combined with the researcher’s expertise were used to ensure the research 
maintained high quality. 
3.7.1 Validity 
According to Heale and Twycross (2015) validity is the extent to which a research concept is 





methods used in the research were of good quality and measured correct variables as intended 
by the researcher. Data collected was valid as per the needs of the research. 
3.7.2 Objectivity 
This research was carried out without any bias. Instruments and methods used to collect and 
analyze data were as per the true requirements of the research. 
3.7.3 Reliability 
Heale and Twycross (2015) describes reliability as the consistency of a research instrument 
having the same results if it is used repeatedly in the same situation. Tools and Instruments 
used in the research were reliable. 
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
 Privacy of data sniffed from WLANs during the research could present an ethical issue. The 
researcher was open to signing non-disclosure agreements (NDA) with parties that could have 
felt uncomfortable disclosing data. However, the researcher was keen and avoided analyzing 
data from Strathmore University network. Data analyzed was captured from experimental 







CHAPTER FOUR  
SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
The researcher gathered data through questionnaires and performing experiments with APs. 
The data was analyzed and requirements were specified from the collected information. System 
models were designed with the help of use case diagram, sequence diagram, domain model, 
entity relationship diagram and database schema. 
4.2 Requirements Analysis 
User requirements and system requirements were considered based on the feedback from the 
interviews with network administrators in Strathmore University and GT Bank and the 
observations made on different AP from different vendors. Tests done on these APs also 
informed the formulated requirements. 
4.21 User Requirements 
The rogue AP detection system must meet the following user requirements: 
i. The system uses graphical user interfaces while the user is interacting with it. Some 
output may be displayed in a console but the user does not need to perform input into 
the system using a command line interface. This simplifies the system usage because 
the user is not required to master technical command line language. 
ii. There is a screen that allows capturing of access point parameters that is, MAC address, 
SSID, and Wi-Fi encryption used. Alternative to this screen is the system to 
automatically pick the parameters from detected APs.  
iii. The system displays a list of all authorized access points in a tabular format on a 
graphical user interface 
iv. The system displays detected rogue APs in a summary table on an interface screen 
v. The system performs detection and classification of access points without the user 
noticing delays. 
vi. The system allows network administrator to confirm an access point on a waiting or 
rogue list as authorized or simply change that status of an access point from rogue to 





vii. System can operate on different platforms with minimum or no technical modifications 
that require advanced skills. 
4.22 Functional Requirements 
These are properties of the system that makes the system to work or be functional. The 
proposed system meets the following functional requirements: 
i. Classification of APs: The system is able to compare registered properties of authorized 
APs with those of rogue APs and accurately classify the rogue APs for the user to see. 
ii. Reporting: The system generates reports on detected APs. The report can further be 
customized to show rogue APs, authorized APs or neighbor APs according to the user 
needs. 
4.23 Non Functional Requirements 
The following non-functional requirements makes the system to meet the user requirements 
specified above: 
i. Reliability: The proposed system will not fail to detect rogue APs whenever they exist 
on the WLAN. Network operators will find it dependable and easier to operate. 
ii. The system will be able to issue true alerts to avoid ambiguity and confusion currently 
seen in most wireless rogue AP detection systems available on the market today. 
iii. Interoperability: The proposed system will be able to run smoothly on different 
platforms because of the Python technology used in developing it. If need be, it should 
require very minimal reconfiguration to run on different platforms.  
iv. Authentication: It only allows authorized users to access it. This is a security feature to 
prevent unauthorized modification of the system properties and registering 
unauthorized APs. 
v. Secure storage of data: The system uses a relational database to securely store data from 
both authorized and detected rogue APs. 
4.3 System Architecture 
The network administrator can manually add authorized APs into the system or authorize 
access points that have been automatically detected by the system once authenticated. The 
administrator reads alerts arising from classification of access points in the system. The system 





connected on the network, the system collects its MAC address, SSID, encryption by sniffing 
and examining the beacon frames. The system then compares the captured parameters with the 
authorized APs parameters. If a match is found, the system puts the AP on a list of genuine 
APs waiting approval or disapproval from the network operator. Disapproved APs are 
automatically listed as rogues. If no match is found, the system will automatically classify the 
AP as either rogue or neighbor based on the configured AP properties. The system the presents 
the alerts in tabular form on interfaces where the network administrator can see. Figure 4.1 
below gives a general view of the proposed system and its operations. 
 
Figure 4.1: General System Structure 
4.4 Use Case Diagram 
Figure 4.2 on the next page shows the use case diagram with one actor, network administrator 
or operator who constantly interacts with the system. The system authenticates the user before 
accepting input from the user and giving any output in terms of tabular reports and alerts to the 
network administrator. The user is responsible of registering all authorized APs on the network 
into the system. The system can also automatically scan and discover APs that are plugged on 
to the network. Detected APs are placed on a waiting list that the network administrator must 





administrator can also approve a rogue AP and make it authorized. Data about APs will be 
securely save in a relational database that can be easily accesses by the system. 
  
 
Figure 4.2: Use Case Diagram 
4.5 Sequence Diagram 
Figure 4.3 shown on the next page is a sequence diagram illustrating how a user interacts with 
the rogue AP detection system. A series of activities and messages are passed to the system by 
the user or through automatic reading of beacon frames. Messages are also passed within the 
system itself and from the system to the user. The user is first authenticated to access the system 
functionalities. The system validates the login credentials by checking against a database of 
authorized users and login. Authentic users can register or enter parameters of authorized APs 
of their choice into the system. The system keeps the parameters in a database of authorized 





connected access point by tapping and interpreting beacon frames from the local area network. 
A classification of the detected APs is done within the system by comparing detected APs 
parameters against already defined parameters. APs whose parameters do not match the defined 
ones are classified as rogues while those that match are put on a waiting list until the network 
administrator approves them as genuine. The system displays brief reports on the different APs 
existing on the network. The user can also select specific reports from the system anytime they 











4.6 Domain Model 
  
Figure 4.4: Partial Domain Model of Rogue AP Detection System 
Figure 4.4 above visualizes and relates words or conceptual classes in the domain of rogue AP 
detection. It also represents an abstraction of the conceptual classes in the system rather than 
using word to describe the classes. This model shows a partial view which is also an abstraction 
of the entire system while ignoring unnecessary details at this point of modelling. When a 
beacon frame is sniffed, it is broken down to parameters relating to the sending AP. The 
parameters are passed through a comparison and classification process (detection) which 
results into the sending AP being categorized as either rogue or put on a waiting list for further 





APs. Unapproved APs will be marked as rogues. The network administrator can also confirm 
a rogue AP as authorized. The system will then add the access point to a list of authorized APs.  
4.7 Entity Relationship Diagram 
 
Figure 4.5: Entity Relationship Diagram 
The system has a number of entities represented with their attributes as shown in figure 4.5 
above.  Access points have attributes such as MAC address, SSID, encryption type. 
Administrator entity has ID, username, full name and password attributes. 
A single user can only have a single set of login details. Once authenticated the administrator 





AP. An authorized AP has many approved parameters that describe it. Many waiting APs or 
none can be confirmed as either rogue or authorized by the network administrator. 
4.8 Database Schema 
 
Figure 4.6: Database Schema 
The database schema shown in figure 4.6 above shows six tables used for holding data in the 
rogueAP detection system. The Administrator table contains the details of the network operator 
and any individuals authorized to access the system to perform functions like approving waiting 
APs as either rogue or authorized and adding authorized APs to the system. It has attributes 
such as the users first name, last name and email. There is a separate login table that hold the 
users’ login details such as username and password. The parameters table stores parameters 
that are common to all APs on the network regardless of the vendor. Authorized APs table will 
have unique parameters that the network administrator has defined for the network. Any AP 





rogue and added to rogueAP table. The system will automatically read beacon frames sent onto 
the network by connect APs and add any detected AP onto waiting list if its parameters matches 






CHAPTER FIVE  
IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
5. 1 Introduction 
This chapter details the conversion of the system designs shown in the previous chapter into 
actual software components and working prototypes. The chapter discussed various model 
items and the test foundation that the researcher put together at the implementation and testing 
stages. The chapter further details the actual implementation of the system where the system 
performs sensing of frames, extraction of parameters, and comparison of the parameters with 
stored parameters and finally classification of the sensed APs. Capturing of authorized 
parameters is also shown. Pseudocodes of the system implementation are shown. The chapter 
also reports on the testing and results that the researcher observed while using the system and 
other tools such as Wireshark. Screenshots are shown. At the end, the researcher draws 
conclusions by evaluating some challenges experienced at the implementation and testing 
stages. 
5.2 Application Components 
Software and hardware parts used in the research followed the type of functionality that the 
system was meant to achieve as per the researchers objectives. They are detailed as shown 
below: 
1. Hardware  
i. A Personal Computer with at least the following properties 
a. 4 GB RAM 
b. 500 GB hard disk storage capacity 
c. Intel duo core processor with 3 GHz speed. 
d. Wi-Fi enabled 
e. NIC that can be in monitor mode 
ii. A local area network with WLAN running 
iii. Wireless access points 
2. Software 
i. Windows 7 Operating System (development and testing operating system) 
ii. Linux (any distribution many need small configuration of the system to match the 
platform) 





iv. SQLite3 database for storage of data  
v. NPcap to facilitate packet capturing 
vi. Wireshark version 3.0.1 for packet analysis 
5.3 Test Environment 
The test environment consisted of a small setup of a WLAN with a PC with two access points 
connected to the network and a Samsung mobile phone hotspot running. The PC running 
Window 7 operating system had Python 3.7 installed. Most Linux distributions come with the 
latest python version preinstalled but it is good to verify that the right version is indeed 
installed. Figure 5.1 below shows a simple confirmation of python 3.7.3 installation on a 
Windows 7 computer of 32 bit system. 
 
Figure 5.1: Python version on Windows 7 
Using Wireshark, it was possible to see that connected access points are broadcasting beacon 
frames in search of clients to connect with as shown in figure 5.2 below. 
 





5.4 Application Implementation 
The system implementation involved actual writing of python scripts to achieve the detection, 
design of interfaces to interact with the administrator and SQLite3 relational database tables 
for storage of data. 
The researcher settled on Python as a language because of a number of reasons; Python 
language has vast large standard support libraries with most programing tasks already bundled 
into it that shortens the programming duration. It mingles well with other web service tools and 
directly interacts with C, C++ and Java especially via Jython. It handles XML and other markup 
languages and is capable of running on current operating systems easily. Pythonn as a 
programming language highly improves programmers’ productivity because of the extensive 
support libraries and very clean object-oriented designs compared to other languages. Still on 
productivity, python's strong process integration features, unit testing approach and good 
control capabilities makes writing codes faster for applications. Finally the researcher found 
that python is a very good for building scalable multi-protocol network systems and 
applications. 
SQLite3 is a lightweight, easy to configure relational database that can run very fast with this 
system on any given device including IOT devices in future developments. 
The figure 5.3 below show the prototype authentication code for authorizing the network 
administrator into the system at the beginning. The user requires a username and a password. 
For demonstration purposes, both the username and password are set to “admin”. 
 





When run, the code yields a login graphical user interface as shown in figure 5.4 below: 
 
Figure 5.4: Login Interface 
The login credentials are retrieved through SQL statement shown in figure 5.3 from an SQLite 
database table whose structure is a shown in figure 5.5 below: 
 
Figure 5.5: Login table 
Once a network administrator is authenticated, they are able to add and view access points 
through various interfaces as shown in the figures displayed below. The administrator can 
navigate from one interface to another through connecting buttons on the interfaces. The system 
captures authorized APs in two different way: One the network administrator can manually add 
access point parameters using the interface shown in figure 5.6 below. Secondly, the system 
can automatically discover APs connected to the network. It puts them on a waiting list if at 
least the running SSID and encryption match the authorized parameters. The network 
administrator can then confirm the auto-discovered APs as either rogue of authorized. 
 





Figure 5.7 below shows the main control panel accessed by authenticated users. The user is 
able to access more system functionalities from this interface. 
 
Figure 5.7: Admin Control Interface 
With the help of python’s scapy module, the code snippet shown in figure 5.8 below attempts 
to capture beacon frames available and attempts to extract and decode the frames to discover 
accessible access points. This code is borrowed from Singh (2017) who attempted to create a 
Wi-Fi packet sniffer.  Beacon frames carry the access points SSID and BSSID (MAC address) 
that we require together with encryption set to compare with authorized parameters to classify 
rogue access points from genuine ones. This piece of code is still work in progress and under 
development and as such one may experience bugs when running it. The researcher invites 
interested people to refine and develop it further as may be needed. 
5.5 Application Testing 
Authorization input test to sanitize login input is as shown in figure 5.9 below. The system does 
not accept empty string logins. A user must supply a username and a password to access it. 
Figure 5.9 on the next page shows an interface displaying an error when a user attempts to 







Figure 5.8: Extraction of IEEE 802.11 Beacon Frames  
Source : Singh (2017) 
 
Figure 5.9: Login Input Testing 
The system will deny access if the supplied username and password are wrong as shown in 






Figure 5.10: Invalid Login 
Authenticated users can enter AP details and add as shown in figure 5.11 below. 
 
Figure 5.11: Add Access Point 
On successful addition of access point, the system notifies the user with a confirmation of 






Figure 5.12: Successful AP Addition 
Successfully added access points are stored in a database table as a new record with a unique 
access point number as shown in the figure 5.13 below: 
 
Figure 5.13: Added AP Record 






Figure 5.14: Listing authorized APs 
Rogue APs are listed as shown in figure 5.15 below. 
 
Figure 5.15: Listing rogue APs 
 
Figure 5.16 below shows a listing of APs on a waiting list. The network administrator is able 






Figure 5.16: Listing APs on Waiting List 
5.6 Application Testing Results 
The researcher performed various tests on the system. The tests are detailed in this section 
which explains the activities done as part of the testing of ‘Multi-vendor WLAN rogue AP 
Detection system’ application. 
i) In Scope Testing 
A functional testing of the following modules fall under the category of scope of testing 
Authentication to ensure only authorized users can access and use the system 
Adding of authorized AP parameters to the database 
Capturing of Beacon frames and extraction of parameters 
Storage of AP data in SQLite Database and Database Connectivity 
ii) Items not tested 
Running of the system on a multiple platforms was not tested by the time this document was 
written. This is mainly because the system is still undergoing modification and time constraints 
relating to submission of the document could not allow the researcher to fully implement. Once 








Table 5.1: System Testing Clases 
Test Class Inspection point Importance 
Functional Does the system allow authenticated users only to access it? High 
Functional Does the system sniff beacon frame from the network and 
extract SSID, MAC and encryption parameters? 
High 
Functional Can the user add authorized access points to the system? High 
Functional Does the system keep records of access points and their 
parameters securely? 
High 
Functional Is the system able to compare stored parameters with beacon 




Does the system operate well on multiple platforms Low 
Non-
functional 
Did the developer adhere to software standards shown by the 
system implementation? 
Low 
Table 5.1 above shows the various test classes performed, the testing criteria and their level of 
importance. Table 5.2 on the next page shows the test results of two main test classes namely 
functional and non-functional. It also shows the results obtained and the author’s comments on 
each test class. 
5.7 Challenges Faced During Implementation 
The researcher faced some challenges while attempting to fulfil all the research objectives. 
These challenges affected the functionality of the system. Limited time of working on the 
research and learning the new technology and implementing it as explained under testing 
section above was the main challenge. Complexity of understanding the technology was also a 






Table 5.2: System Testing 
Test Class Test 
Result 
Comments 
Functional Pass Authorized users were able to access the system and add more access 
points. The system was able to keep a record of the access points in 
a SQLite database. The system was able to sniff beacon frames and 
could compare sniffed parameters and authorized parameters to 
classify an access point as rogue, authorized or waiting. 
Non-
Functional 
Pass The developer adhered to software standards. Python is a 
multiplatform programming language and as such the system will 
run on different platforms when it is finally packaged. The system 
implements necessary security controls. 
5.7.1 Complexity 
Python language is easier to learn but using it to capture network packets and extract parameters 
was complex to the researcher. It required reconfiguration of network interface cards into a 
sniffing mode which was complex to implement on Windows 7 operating system that was 
mainly used during the research. This challenge will be overcome as the research develops the 
system further. Working with some python modules such as scapy on Windows environment 
is complex as it requires reconfiguration of some components of the operating system such as 
transforming a Wi-Fi interface into monitor mode. 
Windows operating system does not support network interface card monitor mode by default 
and as such it took the researcher some time to figure out and install Microsoft Network 





CHAPTER SIX  
DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter expounds the test results realized in the previous chapter by focusing the results 
into goal of the research. The chapter evaluates the properties of access points on a multivendor 
WLAN and how the python script was able to compare the parameters to determine rogue 
access points on the network. The chapter also gives more light on the test results that were 
obtained during the research. 
6.2 Important Parameters of APs on a Multivendor WLAN 
6.2.1 MAC Address 
This is a unique identifying number assigned to a network interface card of APs by the vendors. 
Single vendor WLAN controllers assume that an AP whose MAC address does not match the 
vendors MAC address is rogue by default. This does not give room for APs from other vendors 
to operate on the WLAN. Each AP on the multivendor WLAN has its own unique MAC address 
specified by its vendor that it broadcasts through beacon frames as BSSID. The system 
developed from this research allows APs from different vendors to work on a WLAN without 
being listed as rogues based on their MAC address only. The MAC addresses of all the 
authorized APs are securely stored in a database. Rogues APs can easily be noticed because 
their MAC addresses are not recognized on the system. It is important to know that advanced 
hackers can actually clown a MAC of an authorized AP and assign it to their rogue AP. In this 
case, the rogue AP may be able to connect on the WLAN undetected unless the system checks 
the SSID and encryption parameters discussed below. If all parameters of the sniffed APs 
match those of a genuine AP, the system puts the sniffed AP on a list of waiting APs for further 
approval by the network administrator. This further prevents MAC address spoofing that is 
common with commercial WLAN controllers. 
6.2.2 WLAN SSID 
Service set identifier (SSID) is the wireless name set by the network administrator. It is usually 
broadcasted by APs for clients to connect. It is the easiest for hackers to clown and therefore it 
must be used together with MAC, and encryption standards of AP to detect rogue APs on the 





point whose SSID does not match the approved SSID is automatically listed as rogue. If the 
SSID matches the approved SSID, the system further checks the MAC address and encryptions 
set on the AP. This prevents SSID masquerade attack that is common with commercial single 
vendor WLAN controllers. 
6.2.3 Encryption Standards 
The network administrators determine which Wi-Fi encryption standard they set for their 
WLANs. All the APs on a multivendor WLAN must use authorized encryption standards. 
Encryption standards include WEP, WPA and WPA2. Encryption standards insure that 
information communicated on a WLAN is not easily readable by unintended recipients. Table 
below gives brief description of the common wireless encryption standards in use.  
Table 6.1: Encryption standards 
Encryption 
standard 





It was the first 802.11 security 
standard. It is easier to hack due to 
its use of 24-bit initialization 
vector and weak authentication. 
It uses RC4 stream cipher and 64 or 
128 – bit keys. 
Static master key must be manually 




Was developed to address WEP 
weaknesses. It is backwards 
compatible with WEP devices. 
It operates on personal or 
enterprise modes 
It uses RC4 cipher but longer 
initialization vectors and 256-bit keys. 
Each client uses new key with TKIP. 
It operates on enterprise mode and 
uses stronger authentication via 
802.1x and EAP 
WPA 2 It is a current standard that works 
well with modern hardware 
without affecting hardware 
operating efficiency. It uses both 
personal and enterprise modes 
It uses CCMP and AES as opposed to 
RC4 and TKIP algorithms or advanced 






An access point whose encryption standard does not match authorized standards in the system 
is automatically listed as rogue. An access point with no encryption standard specified is also 
listed as rogue automatically. 
6.2.4 AP Unique Number on Multivendor WLAN 
Authorized Access points on the multivendor WLAN are each assigned a unique random 
number automatically by the system to identify them on the network. This number together 
with other parameters will are used to distinguish rogue APs from authorized APs by the 
system. This number does not come from beacon frames, rather it is assigned to an AP by the 
system. 
6.3 Classification of APs on a Multivendor WLAN 
Commercial WLAN controllers use a combination of different internal heuristics, AP 
classification rules and manual classification by the user to differentiate rogue APs from 
genuine APs. Their main disadvantage is that if an AP does not bear a MAC address from the 
same vendor as the controller, the AP is automatically listed as rogue. This is the inflexibility 
that network administrators want to overcome for them to realize benefits of deploying 
multivendor APs as discussed in chapter one of this research. Multivendor WLAN have APs 
with MAC addresses from different vendors. The system developed from this research is able 
to work with APs from different vendors. An AP is classified s authorized or rogue following 
a combination of MAC address, SSID and encryption that it broadcasts. 
6.3.1 Authorized AP 
These are access points which are allowed to operate on the network. They are registered in the 
system and known to the network administrators. They carry authorized MAC address, SSID 
and encryption parameters specified and accepted by the network administrators on the 
multivendor AP WLAN. They can be added to the system manually by the network 
administrator or automatically discovered by the system during sniffing. 
6.3.2 Rogue AP 
These are access points which are not allowed to operate on the network. They are not 
registered in the system and are unknown to the network administrators. They lack one or all 
the authorized parameters specified and acceptable by the network administrators on the 





malicious people to launch attacks on the network. These type of APs should be detected and 
eliminated from the network as soon as they appear. 
6.3.3 Waiting AP 
Waiting access points are those which the system has automatically detected on the network 
from the extracted beacon frames and the one or two parameters matching the authorized 
parameters. The system cannot immediately classify them as rogue or authorized. They are 
kept on a waiting list until the network administrator confirms them as authorized or rogues. If 
approved, they become authorized otherwise they are put in the category of rogue APs. 
6.4 Rogue AP Detection on a Multivendor WLAN 
The researcher established the MAC address, SSID and encryption are the important 
parameters required to detect rogue APs on a multivendor AP WLAN. The system performs 
rogues detection in three straight forward steps as long as all the parameters are supplied. The 
system will first sniff beacon frames from the network and then extract MAC address, SSIDs 
and encryption supplied by connected access points. Secondly, the system compares the 
extracted parameters with the authorized parameters. Third stage is classification of the APs. 
APs whose all parameters match the authorized parameters are added to the list of authorized 
APs. APs whose one or two parameters match authorized parameters are added to a waiting 
list for further approval by the network administrator. APs whose all parameters do not match 
any of the authorized parameters are automatically added to the list of rogues APs. The MAC 
addresses of APs operating on the WLAN do not have to be from a single vendor unlike in a 
single vendor AP WLAN. Multiple SSIDs can also be configured to run on the network as long 





CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Conclusion 
Wi-Fi usage is gaining popularity in homes, offices and public spaces. One of the major 
concerns that comes with Wi-Fi is security. The presence of rogue access points (APs) on the 
wireless networks poses a major security threat as hackers can leverage the rogue APs to launch 
multiple attacks on the network. Probability of rogues APs occurring on a WLAN is amplified 
if the network has APs from different vendors. Network administrators are increasingly looking 
into rolling out multi-vendor AP WLANs to achieve flexibility and save on costs. With the 
growth of BYOD, unsuspecting employees in a company can also introduce rogue APs to a 
secure wired network. The problem is amplified if the wireless local area network (WLAN) 
consist of multi-vendor APs. Malicious people can leverage on rogue APs to perform passive 
or active attacks on a computer network. Therefore, the researcher saw the need for network 
administrators to accurately, with less effort, detect and control presence of rogue APs on 
multivendor WLANs. 
There exists different solutions to detect and control rogue APs on a WLAN but most of them 
only support a single vendor APs WLAN or require extra hardware resources or modification 
of existing AP firmware. In this research, a model that supports detection of rogues APs on a 
multi-vendor AP WLAN without adding extra hardware or modification of AP firmware has 
been developed. The research took an experimental research design approach whereby the 
researcher performed experiments with different access points in a computer laboratory in the 
research location to help in establishing important parameters pertinent to the study. A working 
prototype of the proposed model was developed using a structured waterfall approach and using 
Python programming language. The developed system was tested a setup WLAN. I was able 
to read and interpret beacon frames from connected APs to categorize them as either 
authorized, rogue or waiting based on parameters discussed in the study. The system issues 
alerts that describe the detected APs to the network administrator for further action. The 
research objectives were therefore met. The developed system is easier to install and configure 
to work on a LAN. It uses graphical user interfaces that enable the network administrator to 






Wireless usage in homes, offices and public spaces is growing and will continue to grow in the 
near future owing to the increase of wireless enable mobile devices in the market. 
Administrators of WLANs will continuously have headaches trying to detect rogue APs on 
their WLANs. The following recommendations are made regarding the research and the model: 
i) The system should be used at a point on the network where it is possible and easier 
to access traffic from all the devices on the network. This will increase chances of 
all rogue access points being detected. 
ii) Authorized AP parameters should be well pre-specified into the system. If the 
network administrator does the registration manually, care should be observed to 
ensure that the parameters are captured correctly. This will enhance detection of 
rogue APs and prevent occurrence of false positive alerts. 
iii) NPcap or its equivalent should be installed on the computer where the system will 
run if the operating system is Window. A Linux equivalent should be installed if 
the developed system is to be run on a Linux environment. 
7.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
The researcher encourages other researchers to expound on the ideas expressed in this research 
and the rogue AP detection model developed to refine the ideas and the model. Future research 
should consider extending this model to include automatic elimination of the detected rogue 
APs on multivendor WLANs. They should consider implementing the system in other low-
level languages such as C and C++. Researchers should advance on ideas from this research to 
study and develop models of managing multivendor devices in enterprises that adopt the 
BYOD concept. BYOD results in multivendor devices appearing on the network. All other 
areas and ideas that are in line with detection of rogue APs on multivendor WLAN that this 
research may have omitted should be addressed by future research done in the same or related 
area of research. 
7.4 Contributions 
This research is a continuation of research focusing wireless network security. It expounds 
more on rogue AP detection models and considers a new perspective (multivendor AP 
WLANs) which many past researchers have not explored. Many researchers are actively 





may find this research useful especially if they are studying multivendor network environments 
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Figure 8.1: Sniffing python code  
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